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Chapter 6 
The Social Location of Scientific 
Practices1 
Hugh Lacey 
The mainstream tradition of modern science denies the historicity of 
scientific practices. It denies that their character changes, and must change, 
in fundamental ways that arise historically, and that are responsive to and 
shaped significantly by varying circumstances. In Section 1 I will identify 
several presuppositions that have been commonly used to support this denial: 
most notably, that the object of science is ahistorical and its methodology 
essentially unchanging, and that the character of basic scientific methodology 
is not dialectically linked with applied science. In Section 2 Kuhn's rejection of 
the presuppositions about the object and unchanging methodology of science 
will be endorsed, thus providing support for what Margolis has referred to as 
a 'remarkable (but somewhat muffled)' version of the historicity of science. 2 
Then, in Section 3, drawing upon a detailed analysis of a contemporary 
controversy between agrobiotechnology and agroecology, I will move beyond 
Kuhn and also reject the other presupposition that there are no dialectical links 
between methodology and application. 
Specifically I will argue that the character of scientific practices reflects 
mutually reinforcing relations with the social location in which they are 
conducted, that is, relations with the value-outlooks · of their practitioners 
and their enabling institutions, and the interests that will be served through 
applications of their products. It is a small step from this to endorsing an 
'unmuffled' version of the historicity of scientific practices, one that admits 
that variations in the character of scientific practices may be dialectically 
linked with historical and cultural variations in the realm of daily life and 
experience and in the structures of social practice. 
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1 Scientific Practices as Lacking Historicity 
Let me briefly recapitulate a story that articulates an important part of the 
self-understanding of the modem scientific tradition, and that has often been 
re-told. Science has a history, a history of progress: of growth, accumulation 
and refinement of scientific knowledge, and of elimination of error. It is a 
history in which methodology plays a central role. Provided only that scientific 
practices are kept free from outside interference and nourished from time 
to time by the input of creative genius, methodology ensures the continued 
unfolding of the progressive development of science. Scientific methodology is 
systematic and empirical, rooted in experiment and measurement. It prescribes 
that empirical data be brought to bear upon theories that, using the resources 
of mathematically articulated lexicons, posit representations of phenomena 
and their underlying order and law. Apart from refinements of detail, scope 
and precision, scientific methodology does not change. Thus, the 'scientific 
revolution' of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marks the effective 
beginnings of science ( anticipated only by scattered fragments of scientific 
knowledge), not a fundamental change in the methodological character of 
scientific practices. 
Since then, the story continues, the cognitive (epistemic) credentials 
of scientific methodology have been certified and repeatedly vindicated. 
Technological success that has been informed by scientific knowledge has 
been one source of the vindication. Another has been the knowledge and 
understanding of 'the world' ('the natural world,' 'the material world') - of 
natural laws, and of things, events, states of affairs, phenomena, structures 
and their underlying components, processes and interactions - that have 
accumulated and been refined, and whose compass continues to expand, 
bounded only by the limit of a 'complete account' of 'the material world,' 
one that in due course would encompass all phenomena. 
The story admits of competing versions with different emphases about, for 
example, the primacy of theory or experiment and the significance of applied 
science. In all versions, however, the tale of progress attends principally to 
such matters as theories that have been developed, available data, technical 
possibilities for experiment and measurement, methodological matters, and 
the (creative) inputs of individuals (or groups) of scientists. That way the 
'rationality,' 'universality' and 'objectivity' of the cumulative and developing 
process are able to be emphasized. There is a place in the story for social, 
economic and political factors: sometimes the interests of utility lead to 
a focus on a particular object of inquiry and, more generally, the rhythms 
and organization of scientific research depend upon the availability of the 
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appropriate material resources and social conditions. Even so, the fundamental 
dynamic of scientific progress is 'rational': science is progressively, and with 
ever greater refinement, gaining knowledge of objects of 'the material world.' 
Social ( and hence historical) factors may lead to giving priority, even urgency, 
to gaining knowledge of specific instances of these objects; but gaining 
knowledge of them contributes to the overall accumulation and refinement 
of knowledge of 'the material world.' It is the accumulation and refinements 
that matter most. The rest, including the temporal order in which objects are 
investigated, is incidental. Nowhere in the story does the character of scientific 
practices change in fundamental ways; they do not exhibit historicity. 
1.1 Suppositions Supporting the Denial of Historicity 
At the root of this denial of historicity are the following three suppositions: 
1 Science aims to gain a kind of understanding that is expressed in theories 
that match ever more completely and accurately an ahistorical object, 
'the material world,' whose underlying order (laws; and structures and 
their components, processes, interactions) is ontologically independent of 
human actions, desires, conceptions, observations and investigations.3 
2 The methodology of modern scientific practices (subject only to 
refinements of precision, scope and the like, but not to any fundamental 
change) enables us progressively to gain understanding of this ahistorical 
object - so that there is no deep historical dialectic of methodology and 
object of inquiry, and so that the questions posed in basic science (while 
they might depend on the results of previous inquiries and the availability 
of instrumentation and appropriate mathematical and conceptual resources) 
do not concern objects insofar as they are historically variable, socially 
located, or playing integral roles in human practices. 
3 The acceptability of scientific theories depends only on considerations 
involving their features and their relations with empirical data of selected 
kinds. 
Clearly, and consistent with supposition 1, the actual arrangements of 
material objects in our vicinity are not causally independent of human 
affairs. These arrangements may be consequences of scientific applications; 
so much so that, although science supposedly lacks historicity, in virtue of 
its applications it has become nevertheless a historical agent of extraordinary 
importance. Indeed, it has been held, the very success of science in informing 
technological developments is explained in terms of its having gained sound 
t 
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understanding of 'the material world. '4 According to the story under review, 
the historical agency of science may account for the ready availability in the 
advanced industrial countries of the social conditions and material resources 
required for the pursuit of science. Moreover, nowadays a good deal of research 
depends upon the availability of instruments that are the products of the most 
advanced and sophisticated technology, whose availability is itself made 
possible by scientific developments. This means that the historical agency of 
science functions as an 'instrumental partner' of scientific research, one that 
enables the methodology to be deployed in a more refined way (for example, 
enabling us to obtain greater precision in measurement and to explore hitherto 
inaccessible spaces). It feeds · back so as to serve the cognitive (epistemic) 
interests of gaining scientific understanding (a 'happy coincidence' of 
social practical interests and knowledge-gaining interests5), but it leaves the 
fundamental character of scientific methodology essentially unscathed. Thus, 
the denial of historicity also involves the supposition: 
4 The historical agency of science (exercised through its applications) is 
only a consequence and an instrumental partner of successful scientific 
practice; it is not a dialectical partner, one that feeds back so as to influence 
the fundamental methodological character of these practices. 
Affirming the historicity of science involves denying suppositions 1 and 2: 
denying that the object of scientific investigation is ahistorical, and maintaining 
that there is a dialectic between methodology and object of inquiry. It is 
deepened by also denying supposition 4, affirming that there is a dialectic 
between methodology and the practices of socially applied science. Kuhn 
has made a compelling case for the denial of suppositions 1 and 2, though he 
seems to accept supposition 4.6 Before addressing Kuhn's argument, let us 
extend the story being re-told a little further. 
1.2 Do Soundly Accepted Theories Represent the 'Material World'? 
According to our story, objects as grasped in the practices of basic science, 
that is, objects as represented in soundly accepted theories, are (approximately) 
identical to objects as they are in the underlying order of the material world. 
Scientific practices, and the modes of interaction and thought that constitute 
them, enable us to grasp things as they are in the ahistorical 'material world,' 
abstracted from the context and conditions of our investigations, and indeed 
from all human related contexts. Since scientific practices are themselves 
historical, how can this be so? Methodology is the key to the answer; but how 
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is it that a methodology deployed within a historical practice can enable us 
to grasp the ahistorical? 
It is able to do so, a common response goes, in virtue of the character of 
and relationships between theory and empirical data. To elaborate: theories 
developed in scientific practices deploy carefully expressed posits (and 
models), typically in mathematical form, about underlying (non-apparent) 
structure and its components, process, interaction and law; so that theories 
abstract the phenomena investigated from their places in the social order, in 
daily life and experience, and even in scientific practices themselves. And data 
are sought out and reported, and the conditions in which they may be obtained 
are often created, in the course of experimental and measurement practices. 
Relevant data, obtained from observing phenomena of which a theory is 
proposed to provide understanding, meet the condition of intersubjectivity 
(and, where possible, replicability), and quantitative and experimental data 
are of special significance. Then understanding of objects of 'the material 
world' is expressed in soundly accepted theories. 
A theory is accepted if its posits (pertaining to certain domains of 
phenomena) are put into the stock of established scientific knowledge, the 
stock of those posits judged to be such that further investigation or testing of 
them would produce at most refinements of accuracy and scope. 7 A theory 
is soundly accepted ( of the phenomena of a specified domain) if it satisfies 
certain criteria, that is, if it manifests the cognitive values highly in relation 
to the available data from this domain - if it has specified characteristics (for 
example, consistency, simplicity), relations with other accepted theories (for 
example, inter-theoretic consistency, consilience ), relations with displaced 
theories (for example, being a source of interpretive power of the strengths 
and weaknesses of a displaced theory), and most importantly relations with 
available empirical data (for example, empirical adequacy, explanatory and 
predictive power).8 Theories that have been soundly accepted of specified 
domains have also reliably informed numerous practical (technological) 
applications. 
What legitimates the move made in the story from (a) 'T manifests the 
cognitive values highly with respect to D' to (b) 'T represents (matches) order 
of the "material world" underlying D'? (Tis a theory and Dis a domain of 
phenomena.) One might respond: Is it not obvious, given that T represents 
the phenomena of D in abstraction from the relations they may have with 
human and social affairs, in terms of their being generated from the underlying 
order, and that the sound acceptance of T depends only on judgments of the 
manifestation of the cognitive values in T with respect to D? Moreover, that the 
move has been frequently and casually made throughout the course of modem 
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science suggests that it is taken to be obvious. In what else could the cognitive 
value of T consist other than a match with parts of the 'material world'? 
Well, it could consist in confirming ( c) 'T encapsulates well the possibilities 
of phenomena of D in so far as they derive from the generative power of the 
underlying order ( their 'material possibilities'),' or (equivalently) in grasping 
these phenomena qua abstracted from their human and social contexts. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the move from (a) to (b) is not mediated 
by (d) 'T reliably informs technological applications';9 but the move from 
(a) to (c) is supported by (d). Often the move from (a) to (b) is made against 
background commitment to materialist metaphysics, which may be considered 
as a suitable elaboration of the posit that all phenomena are lawful or that all 
possibilities are material possibilities: the 'material world' - the ahistorical 
order underlying things - really is such that it can be matched by (and only 
by) the kinds of posits put forward in modem scientific theories. Were there a 
sound a priori case for materialist metaphysics, this might be compelling. But 
today, for the most part, those who espouse materialist metaphysics do so on 
the ground that it is an extrapolation from established scientific understanding 
and the direction of its expected growth. Then, if materialist metaphysics 
provides the ground for the move, the question is begged. 
2 Kuhn's Account of the Historicity of Science 
Kuhn maintains that there is nothing in the character of scientific practices 
that justifies the move from (a) to (b ), 10 and that, furthermore, attention to the 
actual history of science suggests that the move would be clearly unjustified. 
In the history of science, he maintains, we do not find steady accumulation and 
refinement, but instead periods of fundamental discontinuity in the character of 
scientific activity- discontinuities (for example) in what is considered a theory 
worthy of provisional investigation, in what are the appropriate phenomena 
to investigate for the sake of gaining empirical data ( and in the descriptive 
categories of the data) that are to be fitted by theories, and in what kinds of 
posits are taken to be central for shaping scientific investigation. 
2.1 Soundly Accepted Theories are Developed and Consolidated under a 
'Strategy' ('Paradigm') 
According to Kuhn, if theory and empirical data are taken to be the major 
elements of scientific methodology, no sense can be made of the actual 
history of science. Kuhn proposed a third element: paradigm, of which 
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I will consider just one aspect: within a paradigm, research is conducted 
under a strategy. 11 A strategy specifies constraints upon theories that are 
taken to be admissible for provisional consideration (and possible eventual 
acceptance), and (reciprocally) criteria upon the kinds of empirical data (and 
the phenomena from the observation and measurement of which they are 
obtained) that are selected as those appropriate for being brought into the 
appropriate relationships with theories. These are the kinds of data needed 
for testing and selecting among provisionally entertained theories, and 
those that describe phenomena so as to enable their explanations and the 
encapsulation of their possibilities. Admissible theories may be constrained, 
for example, to be formulated with the resources of a specified lexicon (for 
example, the teleological/sensory categories of Aristotelian physics, or the 
mathematical/mechanical ones of Galilean physics), and the data may be 
selected (generally subject to the condition of intersubjectivity and, where 
appropriate, replicability) in virtue of (for example) being representative of 
phenomena of daily life and experience, or of pertaining to experimental and 
measurement practices. 
Given this third methodological element, we are able to identify two key 
(logically distinct) moments of choice: choice of strategy to adopt in research 
practices, choice of theory to accept or reject. Choice of theory is, then, in 
the first instance choice among provisionally entertained theories that fit 
the constraints of the adopted strategy. 12 When properly made, it involves 
judgment about which one of them best manifests the cognitive values with 
respect to the available data, about whether the available data are sufficient and 
about whether the manifestation meets high enough standards for accepting the 
theory of the relevant domains of phenomena. 13 Accepted theories encapsulate 
soundly certain kinds of possibilities that these phenomena permit. (Successful 
application testifies to this.) So adopting a strategy involves identifying the 
kinds of possibilities desired to be encapsulated; accepting a theory involves 
identifying (typically through consolidating posits about how to actualize 
them) the genuine possibilities of these kinds. 
In the light of the Kuhnian insight, our initial story can be reinterpreted 
or (more accurately) replaced by a narrative ofresearch conducted under a 
particular set of strategies - that I call materialist strategies (MS)-that have 
been adopted virtually exclusively within the modem scientific tradition. 14 
MS incorporate the core methodological elements cited in the story. Under 
them, theories are constrained to those with the lexical and mathematical 
resources to be able to formulate posits of underlying order - structure and 
its components, process, interaction and law, where laws express relations 
among quantities. These theories identify the possibilities of phenomena in 
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terms of the generative power of the underlying order (the ones I have called 
'material possibilities'), in abstraction from any place they may have in human 
experience and practical activity, from any links with social value and with 
the human, social and ecological possibilities that they might also admit. The 
'material possibilities' of phenomena include possibilities that are identical 
with possibilities for technological application. Reciprocally, under MS, 
data are selected (subject to intersubjectivity and replicability) so that their 
descriptive categories are generally quantitative, devoid of the categories of 
intentionality and value, applicable in virtue of measurement, instrumental 
and experimental operations. 
Research conducted under MS has been extraordinarily successful: it has 
generated and continues to generate soundly accepted theories of a great 
variety of phenomena; and these theories have been the source of numerous 
and varied technological applications. Kuhn has little interest in applications. 
And, as I have said, he does not take the success of MS in producing soundly 
accepted theories to show that these theories match the ahistorical 'material 
world.' Instead, for Kuhn, it establishes that the world can be (to a marked 
extent) well matched to, or become amenable to grasp within, the categories of 
the lexicons deployed under MS. 15 I add that 'material possibilities' of things 
are successfully identified under these MS; and, in opposition to those who 
adhere to materialist metaphysics, I caution that there is no reason to believe 
that the possibilities of things are exhausted by their material possibilities. 
Within the Kuhnian picture, the object of scientific inquiry is phenomena 
qua grasped under a strategy. Since a strategy is a methodological innovation 
of scientific practices, this object is not ahistorical. For Kuhn himself, the aim 
of science is to solve puzzles whose very definition is strategy-bounded. In 
the final analysis the very questions posed in scientific inquiry are not about 
the 'material world,' but about the power of a strategy to grasp phenomena. It 
follows that suppositions 1 and 2 (see previous section) are not sustainable. On 
my additional gloss, the aim of science is to gain understanding of phenomena, 
and this includes encapsulating the possibilities that they allow. 16 But 
phenomena allow many and varied kinds of possibilities, not all of which can 
simultaneously be co-actualized or even co-investigated- so actual scientific 
investigation opts to pursue certain classes of valued possibilities, generally 
those valued for the sake of application, whose realizability and possibility 
of being investigated is historically conditioned. Thus the unsustainability of 
suppositions 1 and 2 is reinforced. 
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2.2 'Fruitfulness ' as Ground for Adopting a Strategy 
What about supposition 4? It could not be sustained, if (for example) 
the (rational) grounds for adopting a strategy include that it gives rise to 
applications of special interest for those holding a particular value-outlook. 
So we must attend to the grounds for adopting a strategy. 
According to Kuhn, a strategy is adopted for the sake of defining and 
solving puzzles, or (as I prefer to put it) for the sake of generating theories 
and acquiring appropriate empirical data so that theories can come to be 
accepted in virtue of manifesting the cognitive values highly. Then, a strategy 
is worthy of adoption only if it is demonstrated to be fruitful - actually to be, 
and continuing to be, a source of theories that come to be soundly accepted of 
certain domains of phenomena. A fruitful strategy, adopted in the first instance 
following an exemplary achievement, enables investigation to take place in the 
relevant field; 17 and, for Kuhn, so long as a strategy remains fruitful, research 
should be conducted exclusively under it. Within the scientific tradition, he 
maintains, fruitfulness is sufficient, as well as necessary, for the adoption of 
a strategy. Normally a currently fruitful strategy is in place. Then, engaging 
in scientific research implies adopting it - so that normally questions about 
adoption of strategy are neither controversial nor addressed explicitly within 
the scientific community18 - until such time as the limits of its fruitful unfolding 
are reached. Such limits become apparent when anomalous phenomena ( which 
have become considered important for the unfolding research) are identified: 
phenomena that cannot, after prolonged and skilful investigation, be fitted 
into theories that both meet the constraints of the strategies and manifest the 
cognitive values highly, but at best into theories that retain empirical adequacy 
at the price of increasingly diminished manifestations of such other cognitive 
values as predictive and explanatory power and keeping ad hoc hypotheses 
to a minimum. 
On Kuhnian views,. strategies and the lexicons they bear are human 
creations; and a soundly accepted theory is one that succeeds in fitting certain 
phenomena of the world into the structured lexicon of a strategy. So it is 
expected that any strategy will have limits, that its fruitfulness will eventually 
become exhausted. (Any one kind of strategy will fail to encapsulate various 
kinds of possibilities of phenomena.) When the limits of an established strategy 
are reached, and- according to Kuhn - ( allowing a certain latitude of judgment 
about when they are reached) only then, does the scientific tradition license the 
search for another strategy; and then the search is for a new strategy that can 
grasp the anomalies of the old one. At such (revolutionary) moments most of 
the old constraints are lifted, conflicting perspectives are engaged and there 
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is much trial and error, until such time as a new strategy emerges (in a new 
exemplary achievement that offers promise of further fruitful developments) 
that enables the grasp of the old anomalies. 19 Then that strategy comes to 
demand the allegiance of the scientific community. 
Kuhn intends his picture to be both descriptive (under idealization) of the 
history of science, and normative for scientific practice. Indeed, normally it 
does suffice for scientific research to proceed under a single strategy,provided 
that one accepts that what count as scientifically interesting phenomena are 
defineq within the unfolding tradition of science, and that the aim of science 
is to resolve puzzles about them or to come to accept (soundly) theories of 
them. Proceeding in this way enables there to be successful research, practically 
ensures that empirical considerations will eventually lead to clear demarcation 
of the limits of the strategy, and keeps a measure of continuity - through the 
special role accorded to anomalies of old strategies- across the 'revolutionary' 
divides that separate the periods of hegemony of succeeding strategies. Note 
that an argument cannot be extracted out of this that the new strategy is the only 
one that could have developed as successor to the old one.20 Within the Kuhnian 
picture, there are elements of radical contingency: that any successor at all 
will actually emerge, and if one does, what its specific character will be. The 
emergence of a new strategy may be influenced causally by all sorts of 'extra-
scientific' factors (religious, metaphysical, cultural), but what matters, what 
legitimates the adoption of the strategy, is that it generates theories in which 
the anomalous phenomena can be grasped and which define new puzzles. If 
the aim is to solve puzzles about scientifically interesting phenomena and to 
introduce new ones to be solved, that is enough. 
Kuhn has provided a brilliant account of the transition from the hegemony 
of Aristotelian to that of materialist (Galilean) strategies21 as well as some less 
developed accounts of other 'revolutionary' transitions. 22 Following the former 
transition, few products of Aristotelian science have remained in the generally 
accepted stock of knowledge. With the hindsight of developments under MS 
(including new data, greater sensitivity to the role of certain cognitive values, 
and higher standards for estimating the degree of manifestation of the cognitive 
values in theories), it became apparent that Aristotelian physical theories were 
soundly accepted of very few phenomena.23 
Some of Kuhn's critics think that his view entails that, with the eventual 
anticipated surpassing of MS as framers of research, few of its products 
will remain in the stock of knowledge. (Thus they accuse Kuhn of a kind 
of relativism that seems manifestly unacceptable when we think of the 
discoveries of modern science and their applied successes.) But Kuhn's 
view does not entail this. Under MS, numerous theories have been soundly 
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accepted of countless domains of phenomena. These theories encapsulate well 
an increasing number and variety of the material possibilities of phenomena; 
and - while acknowledging the truism that empirical methodologies cannot 
provide certainty - there is no reason to hold that subsequent developments 
of the tradition will lead to removing from the stock of knowledge the 
confirmation of these possibilities. Similarly, there is no reason to anticipate 
(for example) that the atoms of modem atomic theory will go the way of the 
four terrestrial elements of Aristotelian physics, at least if we consider atoms 
to be the constituents of molecules with capacities for generating specified 
effects in specified ( experimental and technological) spaces. Subsequent 
research may lead to their refinement and elaboration, but given how soundly 
accepted atomic theory is, not to their rejection. I have followed Cartwright's 
language here, 24 and her claim that established scientific knowledge is largely 
of capacities of objects: that they tend to have certain effects under specified 
(typically experimental) conditions, without the further supposition that 
such capacities (rather than others they might also have) will be exercised 
significantly in all ('natural') situations. Gaining such knowledge of capacities 
of objects does not ground the supposition that knowledge of the 'material 
world' - of the world as it is independent of its relations with human beings 
- has been gained. Only idle skepticism would cast doubt on the existence 
of atoms today: there are atoms in the world 'that we live in' and 'that we 
have investigated,' and we know their capacities as exercised in various 
experimental and technological spaces and also (no doubt) in many spaces, 
not of human causal origin, in which there is no (relevant) human causal 
involvement. Kuhn's picture fits easily with many kinds of scientific realism. 
But the 'world that we live in' is not the 'world as it is independent of its 
relations with human beings.' 
Thus, it is consistent with the Kuhnian picture that, under MS, we gain 
accumulating knowledge of 'material possibilities ' of phenomena. But, one 
might ask, is this really any different from accumulating knowledge of the 
ahistorical material worlcf? It is, and the difference is of central importance. 
In the first place, the latter idiom, unlike the former, is usually linked with 
the view that all possibilities of phenomena are (in the final analysis) material 
possibilities, and in particular with materialist reductive accounts of human 
cognitive (rational) and moral capacities. Secondly, the material possibilities 
of phenomena are those possibilities that are encapsulated by the generative 
power of the underlying order posited of the phenomena; they are constituted 
as such within scientific practices conducted under MS. Some of them are 
realized in, and realizable only in, experimental and technological spaces of 
human creation (having been posited as the possibilities of these historically 
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bounded spaces). Others are realized in spaces whose underlying causal 
order, as represented under MS, has no relevant human involvement, but 
where that causal order is posited, generally drawing upon the resources of 
theories accepted of experimental spaces, following scientific observation 
aided by instruments themselves authenticated in the course of experimental 
and technological practices. (In some spaces there can be good reason to 
hold that their possibilities are exhausted by their material possibilities.) This 
causal order is constituted in the course of scientific practices as a projection 
from experimental and technological practices; there is no basis here to infer 
to the features of an underlying order that is ontologically independent of 
human beings. 25 
For a theory developed of a domain of phenomena under MS, 'T manifests 
the cognitive values highly of D' implies 'T soundly encapsulates material 
possibilities of D. ' These propositions become established at a particular 
time. Nevertheless, once established, especially if further vindicated by the 
success of practical applications, there is no general reason to expect that 
they will become vulnerable to refutation in the light of outcomes of research 
under different strategies, either current alternative strategies or future ones. 
Strategies change, and so the fundamental character of ongoing scientific 
investigation changes, but that permits a permanent residue of knowledge to 
remain, a residue that may or may not become rearticulated (as a particular 
case or as an approximation) under a subsequent strategy. Historicity of 
scientific practices does not imply the historical relativity of scientific 
knowledge. It does make likely, however, that quite a bit of what is taken 
to be established scientific knowledge (but with insufficient scrutiny of the 
degree of manifestation of the cognitive values) will come to be recognized 
as not properly part of the permanent stock of knowledge. And it fits easily 
with the historical (and cultural) relativity of interest in applying particular 
items of scientific knowledge. 
As more material possibilities become soundly encapsulated in theories, 
the greater is the range of technological possibilities opened up, a matter with 
profound social implications. For Kuhn, technological application remains 
principally a consequence of scientific developments, and also a source of 
additional empirical data to bring to bear on theories, especially by way of 
the instrumental partnership referred to in Section 1. That there is widespread 
technological application, and that it is desired, are not among the (rational) 
grounds for adopting MS; those grounds are (normally) solely connected with 
fruitfulness, and also (at 'revolutionary' moments) with being able to grasp 
the anomalies of the old strategy. Through this complex and subtle narrative 
Kuhn endorses the historicity of science: denying suppositions 1 and 2, while 
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retaining supposition 4, and thus preserving an essentially internalist narrative 
of the history of science. 
3 The Role of Applications 
'Application' refers to two interacting and not sharply separable roles that 
scientific theories can play in social practical life. A theory may apply to 
significant phenomena of daily life and experience; and it may be applied in 
practical activity. It applies to those phenomena when it is used, by way of 
representing them with its categories and principles, to provide understanding 
of them. 'Applying to' involves identifying ( modeling) phenomena as 
characterized using everyday categories with phenomena as represented 
in the theory. A theory is applied in practical ( often technological) activity 
when its posits inform such concerns of practice as the workings of things, 
means to ends, the attainability of ends, and the consequences of realizing 
the possible.26 
In Kuhn's picture, applications are important to the unfolding of the 
scientific tradition only as enticement for the provision of the social, material 
and instrumental requirements of the conduct of research. Its credibility 
depends on dissociating the value, conduct and character of scientific practices 
from social and moral evaluations of applications of the knowledge they 
produce. 
I will now offer an alternative picture in which applications (to and in) 
are more central than Kuhn admits. In it, particular strategies are adopted 
rationally (in part)- subject to fruitfulness remaining a necessary condition of 
their adoption - because they can be expected to give rise to certain kinds of 
applications. 27 Phenomena are in fact ( and should be) brought to the attention 
of basic scientific investigation, not only from the scientific tradition's own 
unfolding ( as Kuhn holds), but also from the realm of daily life and experience 
and social practice, from the 'world in which we live.' Science aims to provide 
understanding of phenomena and, in doing so, where appropriate to make 
sense of our experience and to inform our social practices. Strategies worthy 
of adoption should normally produce theories applicable to phenomena 
significant for current daily life and applicable in current social practices 
- though normally and desirably ( for substantive and methodological reasons) 
the reach of scientific investigation should not be limited to phenomena 
involved in these applications. Many significant phenomena of daily life and 
social practice are not fixed across historical change and cultural variety so 
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that depending on the desired applications, different strategies may be needed. 
If so, supposition 4 could not be sustained. 
In order to provide detail and credibility for this alternative picture, I will 
show that, for some significant phenomena, competing (fruitful) strategies are 
possible. I will focus upon phenomena encountered in farming practices. For 
them, which of the strategies becomes adopted in research depends upon the 
social location of the investigator, and upon the way in which applications are 
valued from this location. Different social locations ( on the one hand, the neo-
liberal global economic project; on the other, grassroots movements of poor 
farmers) lead to the adoption of largely different (competing) strategies. 
3.1 Do Materialist Strategies Suffice to Shape Research? 
The modem realm of daily life and experience is unintelligible apart from 
the applications of knowledge gained under MS, since it has been shaped 
to a great extent by identifying and realizing novel material possibilities of 
things. That provides a good reason for MS to be adopted in the scientific 
community. 28 But, the possibilities of natural phenomena encountered in daily 
life and social practice are not reducible to their material possibilities, those 
they have in virtue of the generative power of their underlying structure ( and 
its components), process, interaction and law. Why, then, prioritize material 
possibilities in the investigation of natural phenomena? Why not attempt to 
shape and adopt strategies under which other classes of their . possibilities 
might be identified, for example those they have in virtue of their places in 
human life and experience and social/ecological systems? Why, for example, 
prioritize investigating seeds so as to identify the possibilities open to them 
under the genetic modification procedures of current biotechnology, rather 
than those they have in virtue of their place in productive and sustainable 
agroecological systems? 
The following answer might be part of the continuation of the story told 
in Section 1: non-material possibilities of objects (phenomena) supervene on 
their material possibilities. The realization of a material possibility (where 
human interactions with natural objects are involved) may be identical to the 
realization of a social/ecological possibility. Successfully producing genetically 
modified seeds and reaping a harvest from them, for example, is also at the 
same time (under current socioeconomic conditions) furthering the process 
in which seeds become commodities.29 But the class of material possibilities 
can (in principle) be identified simply in terms of the generability of each of 
its members from the underlying order. Some material possibilities may also 
be identified qua social possibilities - but systematically all of them may be 
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identified from the generative power of the underlying order. Methodologically, 
then, it is proper to separate the investigations of material and other kinds of 
possibilities; and so to confine the latter to (for example) the various social 
sciences, in which the conditions, interests served and other consequences 
of realizing material possibilities are investigated. The same natural science 
suffices for all value-outlooks - for, regardless of value-outlook, all of the 
possibilities of interest are, or supervene on, material possibilities. 
This answer leaves it open that particular strategies of the social sciences 
might be linked with particular value-outlooks, but not those of natural 
science. Natural science, according to the continued story, is neutral: that is, 
the projects of virtually any value-outlook (for example, of corporation or of 
movement of poor farmers) can make use of some applications made available 
by science in ways that strengthen or further its expression; and (in principle) 
the applications made available by science can serve all ( currently contested) 
value-outlooks in an even-handed way. 30 
I take it to be uncontroversial that a considerable body of scientific 
knowledge gained under MS (molecular chemistry, viral and bacterial causes 
of disease, soil nutrients, the components of a nutritious diet, electromagnetic 
radiation - to give a sample) is available to be applied in ways that can 
strengthen the social expression of virtually any value-outlook that is actually 
entertained today. This explains why it is widely valued ( across value-outlooks) 
that scientific knowledge has been gained under MS, and it provides a reason 
for the esteemed place that research under MS has throughout the scientific 
community. It does not follow that research conducted exclusively under MS 
(or that all research conducted under it) is valued, as distinct from inquiry 
in which research under MS is balanced by ( or subordinated to) research 
conducted under alternative strategies. That is because, in contradiction 
with our story, the products of research under MS are in fact not neutral; the 
'even-handedness' condition is not satisfied. Overall, and especially in fields 
like agrobiotechnology in which research_ is dominated by specific versions 
of MS, their applications favor those value-outlooks whose central practices 
and projects are conducted so as to further the expression of a distinctive way 
of valuing control of natural objects and phenomena. I call this distinctive 
way 'the modem valuation of control' (MVC). 31 MVC concerns the scope of 
control, its centrality in daily life, its relative unsubordination to other moral 
and social values, and the deep sense that control is the characteristic human 
stance towards natural objects; so that the expansion of technologies (informed 
by knowledge gained under MS) into more and more spheres of life and into 
becoming the means for solving more and more problems is highly valued. 
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Favoring value-outlooks that contain MVC violates even-handedness 
because the value-outlooks of various contemporary movements and groups 
contest MVC; and theories, consolidated under MS, do not apply to key 
phenomena and in significant parts of projects of importance to them. Feminist, 
environmental and anti-' globalization' groups bear value-outlooks that contest 
MVC, and also (of special interest for my argument) grassroots organizations 
in Latin America who adopt alternative value-outlooks that emphasize such 
values as 'local empowerment,' full recognition of the entire body of human 
rights specified in international documents, and environmental sustainability. 32 
In the agricultural projects of the grassroots organizations, phenomena of 
sustainable productivity, preservation of biodiversity and meeting the food 
and nutrition needs of the local community are of central importance, and 
their practices aim to preserve and enhance productive and sustainable 
agroecosyst~ms over the long haul.33 Theories developed under MS have 
important applications to these phenomena and in these practices, but they 
are limited (or subordinated); for example, they have supplied knowledge 
of some of the constituents and mechanisms of agroecosystems (micro-
organisms, chemical nutrients), but they shed little light on the possibilities 
of enhancing agroecosystems - in contrast, for example, to that they shed on 
relations between crop yields and chemical inputs to production, and on the 
possibilities of production with transgenic seeds. 
How can that be? Do not agroecological possibilities (like all social/ 
ecological possibilities) supervene upon material possibilities? Despite the 
way our story continues, I am aware of no compelling argument that they do. 
Even if they do, however, it does not follow that they supervene upon material 
possibilities that (even in principle) may be identified under the kinds of MS 
( with their accompanying lexicons) that it is within human powers to develop. 
Some agroecological possibilities may supervene on material possibilities of 
such complexity, subtlety and variability with locale that human beings may 
not be able to identify them in the course of research conducted under MS. 
Be that as it may, numerous material possibilities certainly evade the grasp 
of theories currently or foreseeably accepted under MS. These theories also 
are unable to identify the agroecological possibilities, whose realization is 
sought in projects expressive of the values of' local empowerment.' (This is 
a symptom of the lack of neutrality of the products of MS overall.) If these 
agroecological possibilities do supervene upon material possibilities, and 
if the latter are to be identified, then (at least for the time being) it will be 
qua agroecological possibilities, and not qua generable from the underlying 
order. It will be qua possibilities that things have in virtue of being part of 
a more or less self-regulating system, in virtue of relations and interactions 
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they have with other constituents of the system and the role they play in its 
self-regulation. In so far as such agroecological possibilities may be pertinent 
to desired applications, identification of them will have to be gained through 
research conducted under alternative strategies - agroecological strategies 
(AES). 
It is now clear why the products of research under MS can not meet the 
even-handedness condition. Applying current knowledge gained under MS 
(for example, in agrobiotechnology) may require conditions that would 
undermine the valued agroecological systems. It remains that knowledge 
gained under MS is genuine knowledge; it is expressed in soundly accepted 
theories or with the aid of their categories. When alternative strategies are 
.adopted, and their results applied, that remains untouched. Consistency with 
soundly accepted theories is a mark of the rational; applying them need not 
be. Legitimation of applications involves not only that the theory has been 
soundly accepted, but also that its applications serve the interests of the 'right' 
value-outlook. When a theory is applicable only in a context where certain 
values are expressed and embodied, to appeal to its sound acceptance as 
sufficient legitimation for application implies improperly limiting the range 
of values that may be (rationally) held. When we separate the investigations 
of material and other possibilities, we study things in abstraction from the 
conditions for the realization of their possibilities; so it will not be part of the 
'technical' investigation to figure out the social conditions under which the 
possibilities may be realized - so we may miss that to interact with a thing so 
as to realize certain of its material possibilities may actually be also to treat 
it as a certain type of social object. 
3.2 Agroecological Strategies 
AES and agrobiotechnological strategies (BTS) compete.34 Their established 
theories are not inconsistent, but they encapsulate largely different classes 
of possibilities, which (for the most part) cannot be co-realized in the same 
fields. The competition concerns which class of possibilities to attempt to 
realize in agricultural practices: those of biotechnology which are of special 
interest where MVC reigns, or those of agroecology whose interest derives 
(in the first instance) from the values of 'local empowerment'? 'Technical 
scientific' issues pervade the competition: What is possible? What are the 
risks of application? Can the risks be suitably managed? But, provided that 
both BTS and AES are fruitful, the conflict is waged in the realms of values, 
politics, economics and so on - and where one stands in face of this conflict 
feeds back into the strategies one adopts in research. 
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Agroecologists clearly recognize this; biotechnologists often do not. 35 
Sometimes it is said that the 'theory' of agroecology consists simply of 
ideological critique, or at best of a patchwork of opportunistically gleamed 
fragments of traditional local knowledge - so that · the proponents of 
agroecology are said not to be proposing a 'scientific' research program but 
instead to be submitting scientific claims to ideological critique. This criticism 
of agroecology ignores that research under AES has been fruitful ( see below), 
and that in fact it itself is 'ideological' rather than 'scientific.' Research under 
both BTS and AES gains understanding of phenomena of the world and their 
possibilities - and aims to do so, as well as to gain understanding pertinent 
to value-laden interests in application: ' ... political determinants enter at the 
point when basic [my italics] scientific questions are asked and not only at 
the time when technologies are delivered to society'. 36 If they do not appear 
to do so 'equally', that may be because inequalities of available material and 
social conditions enable research under BTS to proceed routinely without 
its legitimation constantly being called into question.37 The reasons both for 
and against the adoption of AES, and conversely for the exclusive adoption 
of variants of MS, include integrally appeal to value-outlooks. The strategies 
are equally 'scientific': held to fruitfulness, and adopted (in part) because of 
their relations with value-outlooks. There is not the asymmetry that critics of 
agroecology sometimes claim: under MS, investigation is scientific and non-
ideological, whereas research under AES is non-scientific and ideological.38 
Those who adopt BTS, misled by the myth of neutrality, tend not only 
to downplay the empirical achievements of agroecology and to portray it as 
simply an ideology without link with fruitful strategies, but also to be unaware 
that the links of biotechnology with MVC refute the neutrality they claim for 
their own research. For them, BTS are simply particular instances of materialist 
strategies that enable us to identify the possibilities of things (for example, 
seeds) that are made available principally from using (for example) methods of 
genetic modification. BTS are indeed that; they are also those strategies whose 
products do and are expected to inform a particular form of technology, that 
is widely and almost entirely applied in practices that express highly MVC. 
The first description of BTS shapes research practices; the second serves to 
rationalize adopting them rather than other strategies. 
Similarly, AES have two descriptions: first, as particular instances of 
general ecological strategies - that frame research on the relations and 
interactions between an organism and its environment, considered as a more 
or less self-regulating 'whole' of which the organism is an integral part-that 
enable us to identify the possibilities that things (seeds) have in virtue of their 
place in agroecological systems; second, as those strategies that are intended 
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to provide knowledge that can inform the agricultural projects expressive of 
the values (for example) of 'local empowerment. ' 39 
It is in virtue of the first description that AES shape research practices. I 
will elaborate a little. Under AES, research aims to confirm generalizations 
concerning the tendencies, capacities and functioning of agroecosystems, 
their constituents, and relations and interactions among them. These 
include generalizations in which (for example) 'mineral cycles, energy 
transformations, biological processes and socioeconomic relationships' are 
considered in relationship to the whole system; generalizations concerned not 
with 'maximizing production of a particular system, but rather with optimizing 
the agroecosystem as a whole' and so with 'complex interactions among and 
between people, crops, soil and livestock. '40 To illustrate: 
And: 
low pest potentials [ are likely] in agroecosystems that exhibit the following 
characteristics: high crop density through mixing crops in time and space; 
discontinuity of monocultures in time through rotations, use of short maturing 
varieties, use of crop-free or preferred host-free periods ... ; small, scattered 
fields creating a structural mosaic of adjoining crops and uncultivated land 
which potentially provides shelter and alternative food for natural enemies ... ; 
farms with a dominant perennial crop component .. . ; high crop densities or 
the presence of tolerable levels of specific weed species; high genetic density 
resulting from the use of variety mixtures or crop multilines.41 
Restoration of natural controls in agroecosystems through vegetation 
management not only regulates pests, but also helps to conserve energy, 
improves soil fertility, minimizes risks, and reduces dependence on external 
resources.42 
Of particular salience are generalizations that help to identify the possibilities 
for productivity and sustainability of agroecosystems, where 'sustainability' 
has been defined in terms of four inter-connected characteristics: productive 
capacity: 'Maintenance of the productive capacity of the ecosystem'; ecological 
integrity: 'Preservation of the natural resource base and functional biodiversity'; 
social health: 'Social organization and reduction of poverty'; cultural identity: 
'Empowerment of local communities, maintenance of tradition, and popular 
participation in the development process' .43 
Theories, under AES, may be considered to be constrained so as to 
be able to represent sets of generalizations of the above kinds,44 and the 
hypotheses ( drawn from general ecological theory) that are entertained for their 
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explanation and determining the limits of their application. The generalizations 
of agroecology tend to express probalilistic relations or tendencies, and they 
may have greater or less specificity. So, discerning the limits of application of 
these generalizations is especially important. Note how the generalization' ... 
enhancement of biodiversity in traditional agroecological systems [in Latin 
America] represents a strategy that ensures diverse diets and income sources, 
stable production, minimum risk, intensive production with limited resources, 
and maximum returns under low levels of technology' is later qualified by' ... 
we have still not been able to develop a predictive theory that enables us to 
determine what specific elements of biodiversity should be retained, added, 
or eliminated to enhance natural pest control. ' 45 
Data are selected and sought out in virtue of their relevance for appraising 
these theories and for enabling phenomena, relevant in the light of the values 
of 'local empowerment,' to be brought within the compass of a theory's 
applicability. Obtaining the data often requires subtle, regular, painstaking, 
accurate observation and monitoring of a multiplicity and heterogeneity of 
details in the agroecosystems. The skills for this are usually only developed by 
local farmers themselves, so that gaining the data depends on the collaboration 
oflocal farmers and the utilization of their experience and knowledge, and the 
lexicon in which they are reported will reflect the distinctions and categories 
of this experience. Agroecology cannot be pursued with a sharp distinction 
between the researcher and the farmer; the farmer's observations are essential 
to the conduct of the research. Quantitative data are often pertinent: counting 
the number of pests in a given area, measuring the size of crop yields, amount 
of water available and so on; statistical comparisons (for example) of pest 
populations across (for example) monocultures and polycultures, or of the 
yields of different crops when different methods are used. Experimental data 
are sought both to support statistical comparisons, and to demonstrate that 
possibilities can be realized in agroecosystems with certain characteristics, 
for example: ' ... it is possible to stabilize the insect communities of 
agroecosystems by designing and constructing vegetational architectures 
that support populations of natural enemies or have direct deterrent effects 
on pest herbivores.'46 In agroecological contexts, an 'experiment' involves 
introducing, for the sake of observing its systemic effects, a modification 
(under an investigator's control) of an agroecological system. Given the local 
distinctiveness of agroecosystems, the mark of a 'good' experiment cannot 
be its replicability across diverse environmental and social conditions. Note 
that control is involved in agroecological experiments and farming practices, 
but subordinated to the values of 'local empowerment.' 
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Relevant data are often obtained from the study of farming systems in 
which traditional methods informed by traditional local knowledge are used. 
These systems are appropriately submitted to empirical scrutiny because 
agroecological studies have shown 'that traditional farming systems are 
often based on deep ecological rationales and in many cases exhibit a number 
of desirable features of socioeconomic stability, biological resilience and 
productivity. ' 47 They exemplify many known agroecological principles and 
others can be expected to be extracted in the course of studying them.48 They 
can ( with adaptations suggested by research findings) be enhanced with respect 
to all four of the characteristics listed above, and especially with respect to 
'cultural identity' they are often uniquely appropriate for the activities of 
poor, small farmers. It is worth noting that the methods used in these systems 
have been tested rigorously in practice, and have been particularly effective 
(reflecting the experimental approach of traditional farmers) over the centuries 
in 'selecting seed varieties for specific environments'49 - these.are often the 
seed varieties ( or the original sources of them) that are modified genetically 
in biotechnology research and practice. 50 
3.3 Adopting a Strategy and the Social Location of Scientific Research 
At least in some fields, there can be multiple strategies that compete in the way 
described above; and each of the competing strategies may be fruitful. Then 
there arises the question of which strategy to adopt, one for which different 
answers may be proposed and acted on by different investigators. I have 
suggested that actual answers ( explicitly or implicitly) draw upon mutually 
reinforcing relations between adopting strategies and the value-outlooks whose 
interests would be served especially well by applications of knowledge gained 
under the strategies. 
There is, however, a general reason to opt in favor of developing research 
under some strategies other than MS: to test whether all possibilities, or all 
material possibilities upon which non-material possibilities have been assumed 
to supervene, can become grasped under MS. By identifying possibilities that 
are not identical with possibilities currently encapsulated by soundly accepted 
theories under MS, we can pose concrete challenges for research under MS 
to meet. This reason would not appeal to Kuhn; he holds that such challenges 
are unnecessary since, in due course, anomalies will accumulate in the normal 
unfolding of MS. However, there may be bounds to MS, while within the 
bounds there remain unlimited possibilities to be identified. Only tests of the 
kind indicated here can hope to identify these bounds. (I am not sure that Kuhn 
recognized this.) By identifying possibilities of the kinds indicated, it can be 
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probed empirically whether or not there are bounds to the development of MS. 
This general reason sits in tension with the rationales for adopting specific 
strategies, especially when we remember that there is also competition for 
resources for conducting research. Resources devoted to probing the limits of 
MS in this way would be resources taken away from pursuing more favored 
projects and de facto giving the resources to support research whose strategies 
gain their primary rationale from competing value-outlooks. Only a satisfactory 
resolution of this tension, I believe, could restore neutrality as a compelling 
value of scientific practice. 51 The tension is heightened when we consider the 
legitimation of applications. 
Kuhn's picture, recall, portrays applications mainly as consequences 
of scientific developments; and developments under MS have identified 
numerous material possibilities that have become, and are continuing to 
become, realized in applications at an increasingly rapid rate. The efficacy of 
applications depends on the input of sound scientific knowledge that can be 
provided (for many applications) by research under MS. The legitimation of 
some applications depends also on claims about the possibilities of things. 
Consider: under MS, means (involving developments of biotechnology) may 
be identified for producing food sufficient in quantity to continue· to feed the 
world's population. Applying the knowledge thereby obtained is legitimated, 
however, only if there are no 'better' ways of producing sufficient amounts 
of food - ways, for example, that would be part of agroecosystems that were 
structured so that the food is not only produced, but also so that everyone is 
actually fed sufficiently and nutritiously, and that sustainable ( and improving) 
and productive agroecosystems are maintained. 52 But the possibility of 
producing sufficient food by developed and expanded uses of agroecological 
methods cannot be investigated under MS. So research under MS cannot 
provide a crucial item of knowledge (or the means for attempting to gain it) 
needed to legitimate endorsing biotechnological methods as essential to the 
solution of the world's food problems. 
The proponents of bringing biotechnological methods to the core of 
agricultural production respond that there is no evidence that developed 
agroecological methods could produce sufficient food. In responding to this 
assertion it is important to keep in mind that producing sufficient quantities 
of food to feed everyone does not imply that everyone will be fed. Currently, 
sufficient food is produced, but hunger persists. 53 Given that agrobiotechnology 
plays an integral role in the global economic system, under which hunger 
currently persists, one might wonder why the expansion of production of food 
promised by the new methods will be any more likely to lead to the hungry 
being fed. Who is fed, and who is not, is not independent of the methods of 
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production. Even ifthere were strong evidence that enhanced agroecological 
methods could not produce sufficient food to feed everyone, it might still be 
the case that agroecology needs to be developed so that the currently hungry 
and their descendants will be fed. The legitimation of the furthering of 
agroecology needs only this more modest claim which, I believe, is the claim 
that agroecologists actually make. Perhaps, in order that everyone be fed, a 
variety of farming methods will have to be used. The issue is an empirical one, 
but investigations conducted exclusively under MS cannot adequately address 
it. It can only be responsibly investigated within a theoretical framework that 
investigates the full causal nexus of production and consumption of food, and 
more generally of human well-being, and in a process that is responsive to 
the needs, interests and value-outlooks of everyone. 
As things stand, it is true that the evidence is less than compelling 
that agroecological methods can be enhanced and expanded to produce 
sufficient food to feed everyone. However, that could be because, while 
AES have displayed a measure of fruitfulness, their limits have effectively 
been reached; or because, due to lack of the necessary social conditions and 
material resources, there has been much less research conducted under AES 
than under BTS. This matter could be explored empirically by providing 
conditions to further develop agroecology in those areas where there is hunger 
and an available rural workforce (thus furthering it under the legitimation 
of the modest claim referred to in the previous paragraph, in areas where its 
effectiveness has been repeatedly demonstrated;54 this would enable virtually 
risk-free investigation of the possibilities of agroecological production. 
The proponents of biotechnological methods see little urgency in conducting 
such an investigation because, I think, the widespread implementation of 
agroecological methods would be incompatible with the social structures, 
values and policies under which biotechnology is developing. For them, 
agroecological methods cannot produce sufficient food because they cannot 
be developed under these social conditions. There is, for these proponents, 
no better way to produce the needed food, because biotechnological methods 
are confirmed as providing the most efficacious of the available possibilities 
whose realization could be informed by theories established under MS, and 
thus could most usefully further the expression of MVC; and, for them, 
furthering MVC (and so, at the present moment, fitting into the neo-liberal 
global economic project) has become a condition on a legitimated way. In 
short, the legitimation available to be offered of prioritizing biotechnological 
methods - without begging questions whose empirically grounded answers 
require developments of AES - does not rest upon empirical confirmation that 
agroecological methods are insufficient for producing the food. It rests upon 
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commitment to MVC (and the values of 'globalization'), upon valuing the 
material possibilities of biotechnology because to realize them is, at one and 
the same time, to realize valued social possibilities. 
There are no 'scientific' reasons to decline to appraise empirically the 
possibilities of agroecology. Given that applications involve issues not only 
of efficacy, but also of legitimation or social value, it is just arbitrary to insist 
that what counts as a 'scientifically' interesting phenomenon is determined 
only in view of the internal unfolding of the scientific tradition and not also by 
interests connected with application. Thus, the competition between BTS and 
AES cannot be dissolved by appealing to the general character of science. The 
marginalization of AES in the mainstream, I have suggested, is explained (when 
we probe for the reasons) not because, after adequately providing for efforts 
to develop them, serious doubts about their fruitfulness have been confirmed. 
Rather it is because they cannot lead to applications of interest for MVC; and 
perhaps also because, if their fruitfulness were confirmed, the legitimation of 
prioritizing biotechnology in agriculture would be challenged - though in fact 
the proponents of biotechnology tend not even to entertain that the far-reaching 
fruitfulness of AES might, given the opportunity, be confirmed.55 Conversely, 
the reasons for adopting AES (which, I repeat, draw upon basic knowledge 
gained under MS in all sorts of ways) as an alternative to BTS are connected 
with critique of MVC and with holding such competing value-outlooks as 
that of' local empowerment.' Either way, adoption of strategies, and thus the 
character of research conducted, is unintelligible if separated from the social 
location of scientific practices and their applications; and thus, in tum, social 
location can serve as a ground (but not one that downplays the importance of 
fruitfulness) for critique of scientific practices, and as a source and condition 
of alternatives. 
4 Conclusion 
The object of scientific inquiry is phenomena as grasped under a strategy, 
so much so that it varies with strategies and cannot be characterized in 
strategy-neutral terms. That is Kuhn's insight. Strategies, a key component of 
scientific methodology, are historically variable, and so too is the object 
of scientific inquiry. 
To understand phenomena is to describe and explain them, and to identify 
the possibilities they admit. A strategy has the resources to identify a particular 
class of possibilities. Any one strategy is worthy of adoption only if, given 
the opportunity and appropriate resources, it shows itself to be fruitful: that 
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is, if it is successful in actually identifying possibilities of the relevant class 
(encapsulating them in soundly accepted theories). Competing strategies 
explore classes of possibilities ( often of the same phenomena, for example, 
seeds) that cannot be co-realized: for example, realizing (to any significant 
extent) the possibilities of transgenic seeds cannot be co-realized with certain 
possibilities of productive and sustainable agroecosystems. 
When two fruitful strategies compete, what are the reasons to adopt one of 
them rather than the other? Since both are fruitful, reasons based exclusively on 
cognitive (epistemic) value cannot favor one rather than the other. As illustrated 
in the discussion of Section 3, my answer is: Adopt the one that enables us to 
gain understanding that is applicable to phenomena and (where appropriate) 
in practical projects of significance for our value-outlooks, thus the one that 
identifies possibilities that, if realized on application, would further these 
projects. This provides a good reason to adopt a strategy without, at the same 
time, denying that the scope and value of the basic understanding gained in 
scientific research transcend interest in applications. It is a reason that points 
to the ( social) value of research conducted under the strategy. 
Both fruitfulness and applicability are necessary conditions for the adoption 
of a strategy. We adopt a strategy partly for the sake of gaining theories that are 
applicable in ways that are significant for our value-outlooks. In a particular 
field of research, there may be no relevant disagreements across value-outlooks 
about what are the phenomena and projects for which applications of theories 
are desired. Then competing strategies are unlikely to emerge. Different value-
outlooks, however, may (in some fields) lead to different appraisals of the 
significance ( social value) of applications, and thus to their respective adherents 
adopting competing strategies (for example, AES and BTS). Where this 
happens, a case can be made that a plurality of strategies should appropriately 
be supported within the whole scientific community ( despite the resulting 
tensions that would be occasioned by the fact that the classes of possibilities 
being explored are not co-realizable in the same contexts). Moreover, if my 
suggestion is correct, it will be no surprise that one kind of strategy comes to 
be adopted virtually exclusively in the scientific community, and that adopting 
a strategy is not generally recognized as a matter of choice or as in need of 
rational support, when in it and its supporting institutions there is hegemony 
of values (for example, MVC or those of the global economy). 
According to the picture I have offered, application plays a central role 
in shaping scientific practice. It is not just a consequence ( or instrumental 
partner) of successful research, but where it is valued in social practices that 
one endorses, it is part of the very reason to adopt a strategy. We might put 
it: Possibilities, in so far as they are identical to possibilities for application, 
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partly constitute the object of scientific inquiry. Such possibilities, of course, 
are objects of social value and historically and culturally variable, functions 
of the social location of the scientific practices. The strategies we adopt are 
those suitable for exploring these possibilities, and so they too must vary as 
a function of the social location of scientific practices. Thus, applications 
- successful, desired, anticipated - feed back so as to influence at the most 
fundamental methodological level the way in which scientific investigation 
is conducted. 
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components of the underlying order are increasingly becoming thought of as objects to 
which one may hope to obtain intellectual property rights; thus, among other things, as 
historically constituted property and commodities. 
4 See Lacey (1999a), Ch. 6. 
5 Ibid., pp. 124--6. 
6 Supposition 3 will play no role in the present argument. Properly articulated, using the 
notion of cognitive values, it may be compatible with the denial of supposition 4- see my 
defense that theories, regardless of the strategies under which they are developed, may 
become accepted in accordance with impartiality (ibid., Ch. 10). 
7 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
8 Cognitive values are the criteria of the cognitive or epistemic value (rational acceptability) 
ofa theory. I have discussed them extensively elsewhere (ibid., Ch. 3), and defended that 
they can be distinguished from social, moral and other kinds of values (Lacey, 1999b). I 
will not address how the history of the cognitive values might bear upon the historicity 
of science; this may have implications regarding supposition 3 that I will not entertain 
here. 
9 Lacey (1999a), Ch. 6. 
10 Ibid., Ch. 7. 
11 Kuhn (1970). For the history of Kuhn's use of 'paradigm' and the terms he introduced in 
subsequent work to refine and replace it ('disciplinary matrix', 'structured lexicon'), see 
Hoyningen-Huene (1993) and Sankey (1994). I have elaborated the notion of strategy (my 
terminology, not Kuhn's), as well as ideas introduced in the next few paragraphs, in detail 
elsewhere (Lacey, 1999a; 1999b). 
12 Under certain conditions, that are connected with applications (see next section), theory 
choice may be made across strategies (Lacey, 1999a, Chs 7, 10; 1999e). 
13 Lacey (1999a), pp. 62-6. 
14 I have emphasized elsewhere (ibid.) the variety to be found among materialist strategies. 
Not all of them represent reductionist tendencies, and not all of them require that laws 
be deterministic. I say that MS are adopted 'virtually exclusively' in modem science: 
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ecology (which is not confined to deployment of MS) usually is considered to fall under 
the umbrella of modem science. 
15 Kuhn (1970) has developed this idea in a rich way using the phenomenological notion 
of 'world.' The objects of the 'world' in which investigations under MS are conducted 
are partly constituted by the practices themselves. I have discussed this in Lacey (1999a, 
Ch. 7; see also Lacey, 1999c; 1999e). 
16 Lacey (1999a), Ch. 5. 
17 I will not keep repeating the qualification: 'in the relevant field' . It applies to all the remarks 
about strategies (and research framed by a strategy) that follow in this chapter. 
18 That helps to explain why often it is thought that science is just that inquiry conducted 
under the currently dominant strategies. (Modem science is inquiry conducted under MS.) 
Since normally there is no controversy about MS in the scientific community, their role 
can easily remain hidden so that it is not recognized that there may be other strategies, and 
investigation that might be being conducted under another strategy tends to be dismissed 
as 'unscientific.' This theme comes up again in Section 3: agroecological strategies (see 
also note 55). 
19 Cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1993), pp. 241-3. 
20 Lacey(1999a),pp.172-5; 1999e. 
21 Kuhn (1956). 
22 Kuhn (1970). 
23 Lacey (1999a), Ch. 7. 
24 Cartwright (1999). 
25 Of course, this does not prove that there is no such underlying order, as Sankey (1997) 
- see Lacey (1999c)-has emphasized. 
26 Lacey (1999a), 14-15. 
27 Here I only present my alternative picture, showing how it illuminates an important 
contemporary controversy. See Lacey (1999a, Ch. 7; 1999e) for fuller argument. 
28 Endorsing the values expressed and furthered by the prevailing social order may provide 
a good reason to adopt MS virtually exclusively - of course, the reason is only as good 
as the grounds for endorsing these values (Lacey (1999a), Ch. 6). That they are widely 
endorsed, and expressed deeply in dominant modem economic and political projects, may 
largely explain that scientific research is conducted almost exclusively under MS. 
29 Kloppenburg (1987); Lacey (1999a, Ch. 8) and the references there. 
30 Lacey (1999a), Ch. 4; 1999b. 
31 See Lacey (1999a), pp. 111- 30, for a detailed analysis ofMVC and for the argument-also 
Lacey, 1999d. 
32 Lacey (1997); Lacey (1999a), Ch. 8. 
33 Control of natural phenomena is, of course, a value for them - as it is in every culture 
- but, unlike in MVC, it is subordinated to the listed core values. 
34 My account of agroecology here is derived from the numerous writings of Altieri ( especially 
Altieri, 1995) with some adaptations of terminology (that involve little strain) so as to fit 
into my general analytic framework. (See also Lacey, 1999a: Ch. 8.) 
On biotechnology: ' ... in essence [biotechnology] implies the use of microbial, animal 
or plant cells or enzymes to synthesize, breakdown or transform materials . . .. Traditional 
biotechnology refers to the conventional techniques that have been used for many centuries 
to produce beer, wine, cheese and many other foods, while "new" biotechnology embraces 
all methods of genetic modification by recombinant DNA and cell fusion techniques, 
together with modem developments of "traditional" biotechnological processes' (Smith, 
1996: 2-3). In the text I am using 'biotechnology' in the sense of 'the "new" biotechnology.' 
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I am also taking it to refer to a field of scientific research: that conducted under BTS, 
research that aims to produce knowledge that can enhance the methods specified in the 
quote. Thus, depending on contest, 'biotechnology' may refer either to a field of scientific 
research or to specific methods deployed in agricultural practices. 
Note that the way in which AES and BTS compete does not preclude that each may 
draw from the positive results of the other in limited respects. In this chapter I will 
not explore whether and how this might happen. On the relationship of the kind of 
competition, exemplified by that between AES and BTS, with what Kuhn has called 
'incommensurability,' see Lacey, 1999e; and see the next paragraph for how it involves the 
difficulties of communication that Kuhn diagnoses to be part of incommensurability. 
35 See the exchange between Altieri and Rosset (2000) and McGloughlin (2000). 
36 Altieri (1994), pp. 150-51. 
37 See note 18 above. 
38 McGloughlin (2000). 
39 In both cases (BTS and AES) the adopting of the strategies is rationalized (in part) by 
reference to particular values. This does not per se challenge the impartiality (sound 
acceptance) of the results consolidated under either strategy; it may their neutrality. In 
the case of AES, since objects (including agroecosystems themselves) are not abstracted 
from their places in human experience and social relations, values enter into the subject-
matter of the investigation: under what conditions are certain values (for example, social 
justice, cultural identity) able to be further embodied? (Under MS, all comparable questions 
are pushed into the social science inquiries that may inform applications.) Note that the 
questions (posed under AES) are about the degree of embodiment and manifestation of the 
values; reaching empirically based results about them (as distinct, perhaps, from having an 
interest in them) is logically independent of endorsing the values. There can be impartial 
results about the degree of manifestation and embodiment of values (Lacey, 1999a, 
Ch. 2). 
40 Altieri (1987), pp. xiv-xv. 
41 Altieri (1999), pp. 24-5. 
42 Altieri (1994), p. 150. 
43 Altieri et al. (1996), pp. 367-8. 
44 See Lacey ( 1999a), pp. 193- 6 for further discussion. 
45 Altieri (1994), pp. 7, 38. 
46 Ibid., p. 7. 
47 Altieri (1987), p. xiii; for details and examples, see Altieri, 1995: Ch. 6. 
48 Altieri (1995), p. 143. 
49 Ibid., p. 116. 
50 Kloppenburg (1987); Lacey (1999a), Ch. 8. 
51 Lacey (1999a), Ch. 10. 
52 Altieri and Rosset (2000); Kloppenburg and Burrows (1996). Other important issues are 
also involved in the legitimation of prioritizing ( or even using) biotechnological methods: 
for example, concerning possible undesirable health and environmental side-effects. They 
have been widely discussed (see, for example, Rissler and Mellon, 1996). 
53 Boucher (1999). 
54 Altieri et al. (1996). 
55 My explanation is consistent with it being the case that, in the consciousness of researchers 
in biotechnology, they are simply following through on the latest options provided under 
MS, with no issue of choice of strategy involved (see note 18). If there is no choice of 
strategy, then criticism of biotechnology becomes seen simply as criticism of engaging 
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in research per se, or as having the effect of threatening funds for research. Some recent 
reactions of biotechnology researchers to criticism have been of this kind. Ironically, they 
see threats to the ' autonomy' of science coming more from their critics than from the 
corporate sponsors of much of their research. 
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